Ukraine: Institutional Disparities in the Ukrainian Semipresidential System/Poland: Division and balancing of powers in Poland – determinants, transformations, experiences

10 07 2025

On 10 July 2025, the fifth seminar in the series “Political System at Work”, organised as part of a research project devoted to the analysis of the functioning of state institutions in constitutional practice, was held at the University of Warsaw Library. Opening the meeting, the project coordinator, Dr Agnieszka Dudzińska, emphasised that the research team was approaching the halfway point of the planned thematic series, the aim of which was an in-depth analysis of the impact of constitutional solutions on political and administrative practice.

Thursday’s seminar was devoted to the analysis of the practical functioning of the mechanisms of division and balancing of powers in the political systems of Poland and Ukraine. The papers by Dr Nataliya Kononenko (National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine) on institutional disparities in the Ukrainian semi-presidential system: checks and balances 2014-2025 and Dr Michał Mistygacz (University of Warsaw) under the title “Division and balancing of powers in Poland – determinants, transformations, experiences” were the starting point for an in-depth discussion on institutional stability, systemic reforms and challenges for democracy in the context of political and war crises.

Institutional Disparities in the Ukrainian Semipresidential System

Dr Kononenko’s paper dealt with institutional disparities in the Ukrainian semipresidential system from 2014 to 2025. The author presented a conducted analysis of the functioning of the ‘check and balances’ principle in the conditions of competency conflicts between the President, the Government and the Parliament.

The speaker began her presentation by stating that, according to the Constitution of Ukraine, the state has the form of a semi-presidential republic with a parliamentary-presidential model of separation of powers. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is statutorily endowed with key functions such as forming coalitions, participating in the appointment of the Cabinet of Ministers, approving its programme of activities and controlling the government. After generally outlining to our team the issue of the political accountability of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to parliament, Dr Kononenko moved on to compare the Ukrainian institutional model with other European semi-presidential systems. The Ukrainian model has peculiar features such as the duality of subordination of the executive, according to which the government is accountable to both the parliament and the president, while the head of state retains considerable powers over personnel policy, national security, foreign policy and has influence over the actions of local state administrations and the legislative process. This creates the conditions for institutional rivalry between the prime minister and the president.

Formally, Ukraine has a parliamentary-presidential model, but in practice the president dominates the government, which disturbs the balance of power (so-called presidential-dominant semi-presidentialism). Moreover, the speaker pointed out that during the period of war with Russia, the president additionally gained real tools to influence the executive and legislative process.

The speaker pointed to four institutional traps that weaken the government and parliament. First, unstable and formal parliamentary coalitions that have no real political function. Second, the idealisation of technocratic governance, leading to a weakening of political accountability. Third, the lack of mandatory parliamentary approval of the government’s programme. There is also the absence of a constructive vote of no confidence, and mechanisms for resolving government crises are ineffective. Other causes of imbalance include the dominance of the president in personnel policy, the practice of presidential “mono-majority”, the marginalisation of the government in the legislative process (low percentage of drafts) and the lack of clear regulations on coalitions.

In conclusion, the speaker emphasised that the current systemic model functions as a “militant democracy”, able to operate despite war and institutional inconsistencies. However, although the system has demonstrated flexibility and resilience under wartime conditions – it has exhausted its potential. Constitutional reforms and clear accountability mechanisms for the government and parliament are necessary to avoid further institutional erosion and ensure that Ukraine can function effectively as a democratic state in the European integration process. Clear assignment of political responsibility and rebalancing of the centres of power are crucial.

The paper sparked a lively discussion that touched on issues such as the doctrine of the weak veto (i.e. the failure of the President to sign laws), the representation of various social groups by the Verkhovna Rada, the exploitation of social resources by technical rule or the political influence of oligarchs and foreign corporations.

Division and balancing of powers in Poland – determinants, transformations, experiences

In the second part of the seminar, Dr Michał Mistygacz presented our research team with a paper devoted to the evolution of the principle of division and balancing of powers in Poland, its constitutional formulation and real distortions in the years 2015-2023. The author juxtaposed the traditional Monteskian tripartite division of powers with the real functioning of the system of government in the Third Republic – showing both the formal structure and the mechanisms of its erosion.

The principle of the separation of powers in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland is expressed in Article 10(1). The Constitution is the aftermath of the transition period and the closure of an eight-year period of systemic provisionalism. The aforementioned article expresses the classical tripartite division: the legislature (the Sejm and the Senate), the executive (the President and the Council of Ministers) and the judiciary (courts and tribunals). The constitutional model also provides for institutions of a controlling power nature (e.g. NIK, RPO, KRRiT, NBP), which can also be considered to be part of the system of balance of powers. The separation of powers is based not only on separation, but also on mechanisms of cooperation, checks and balances.

In the traditional view, the division of powers is a “static triangle” with equal sides – mutual separation and protection of competences. However, the speaker points to the need for a dynamic approach: the relationship between powers changes over time, is fluid and dependent on political will. Examples of institutional interpenetration of competences are: the presidential veto, the legislative initiative or the participation of parliamentarians in government.

The speaker went on to refer to the post-2015 constitutional crisis: the principle of the balance of powers was violated in practice – there was a concentration of real power in the hands of the ruling party and its leader, who had no formal state function. According to the speaker, the erosion of power included the politicisation of the Constitutional Tribunal and the NCJ, the subordination of the prosecutor’s office to the government, the restriction of the independence of the courts (laws disciplining judges, the so-called muzzle law), the marginalisation of parliament as a venue for debate (legislative slips, night votes, “simulated parliamentarism”). The speaker then pointed to the gradual systemic neutralisation of the opposition and the reduction of its effectiveness because of this.

In his concluding remarks of the speech, Dr Mistygacz pointed out that after 2015, Poland entered a phase of ‘constitutional degradation’ – the gradual and deliberate weakening of the rule of law without formally amending the Constitution. Formal constitutionalism has been supplanted by political constitutionalism: institutions work on paper but no longer fulfil their real guarantee function. The speaker advocated a return to the actual application of the Constitution, the restoration of public trust and the depoliticisation of institutions as a condition for the restoration of the rule of law.

The discussion following the paper focused on various aspects of the functioning of the principle of the division and balance of powers in Poland and its evolution under conditions of political and geopolitical crises. Issues raised included the centralisation of power, tensions in competences between the government and local governments, and the weakening position of the parliament in the face of the increasing importance of the executive. The limited effectiveness of control mechanisms, such as the individual vote of no confidence, and the difficulties in the functioning of the parliamentary opposition were also pointed out. The problem of the opposition’s agility, the importance of political culture and the possibility of institutionally strengthening the role of parliament were considered.

The seminar showed that in both Poland and Ukraine, checks and balances are being tested by political and geopolitical realities today. The papers and the accompanying discussion highlighted the need not only for institutional reforms, but also for a constitutional culture and cooperation between authorities as a foundation for sustainable democracy.